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The ‘New Right’ and its legacy for British conservatism
Ben Williams
University of Salford, Salford, UK
ABSTRACT
New Right theories have had a major impact on British politics since 
the emergence of Thatcherism and the end of the so-called ‘years of 
consensus’ in the mid-1970s. In radically rejecting the conventions of 
postwar politics in terms of the management of both economic and 
social policies, the ideas of the New Right initially came to signifi-
cantly shape the policies of the Thatcher government (1979–90), and 
indeed have continued to wield influence over other administrations 
in subsequent years. However, to what degree this influence has 
been retained as we enter the third decade of the twenty-first century 
is a matter of conjecture, specifically in the wake of Conservative 
Party ‘modernization’, as well as the advent of major crises such as 
the 2007/8 economic crash and the Covid-19 pandemic. Within this 
context, this article seeks to assess and analyse the ongoing legacy of 
the New Right and its impact on British Conservatism over this 
sustained historical period.
Introduction
This article aims to explain the development and evolution of ‘New Right’ ideology as 
a key variant and influence on contemporary Conservative political thought, and its 
consequent impact on the modern-day Conservative Party’s socio-economic policy 
agenda. As an economic and political tradition that gained momentum and traction as 
the postwar era progressed, New Right theories aspired to revive the individualistic values 
of the liberal ‘free market’ environment that had prevailed for much of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, while in the process dismantling and restructuring what its 
advocates viewed as the failing post-1945 welfare settlement. This neoliberal economic 
outlook subsequently established itself as an unerring influence within British 
Conservatism during the 1980s in particular, and in the process discarded much of the 
party’s postwar paternalistic and occasional collectivist tendencies.
In therefore analysing precisely what the key principles and subsequent impact of this 
specific brand of Conservatism have been, it is necessary to address its origins, its 
development as a political concept, and how it subsequently attached itself onto the 
policy-making agenda of Margaret Thatcher’s political leadership from 1975 onwards. 
Particular attention is therefore required as to the extent of the New Right’s ideological 
thrust in shaping the policy agenda of the Thatcher administration between 1979 and 
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1990, and how it potentially continues to cast its influence over party policy (and in turn 
wider British politics) beyond the Thatcher era and into the early twenty-first century. 
This ongoing impact of the New Right is specifically analysed in a more contemporary 
sense in the context of an initially gradual and then concerted ‘modernization’ process 
pursued by the Conservative Party since the late 1990s, as well as the challenges for 
governance created by the global economic crash of 2007–8 and the coronavirus pan-
demic of 2020.
The origins of the New Right
The growing theoretical influence of the New Right reached its zenith in a sustained 
period of political hegemony for the Conservative Party during the 1980s, a development 
initially moulded by the dynamism of its own agenda, but further fuelled by the apparent 
failures of the postwar ‘social-democratic’ political settlement. The Thatcher government 
was evidently influenced and intellectually bolstered by the neoliberal theories of econ-
omists of the New Right such as Milton Friedman and F.A Hayek; Friedman being 
associated with the ‘Chicago School’ (University of Chicago), with Hayek attached in 
academic terms to the ‘Austrian School’. While both Friedman and Hayek were highly 
critical of the Keynesian postwar economic settlement that had been consolidated across 
much of the western world for approximately three decades, they did not wholly agree on 
specific solutions. Hayek had initially expounded his warning of escalating ‘statism’ in his 
1944 seminal text ‘The Road to Serfdom’, while Friedman was a more contemporary 
figure who became US President Ronald Reagan’s economic adviser and who has been 
referred to as the founding father of monetarist theory; which primarily advocated that 
a government’s key responsibility in terms of economic management ‘was to ensure that 
the currency was sound’,1 which practically entailed limiting the money supply, reducing 
state intervention/public spending, and also adhering to the ‘monetarist axiom’2 of 
restricting borrowing. A further underlying influence on the moulding of New Right 
thought into practice was Maurice Cowling, a conservative Cambridge historian who 
emphasized the value of individual freedom (notably from the state) as one of the 
emerging strands of this ideological movement, notably ‘the sort of freedom that will 
maintain existing inequalities or restore lost ones’.3 At a basic level, these varying key 
influences on New Right thought shared major concerns about the escalating ‘statist’ 
tendencies of many western liberal democracies, concluding that the postwar ‘social- 
democratic’ model of the state represented an unjustified ‘source of coercion’4 regarding 
the autonomy of individual citizens.
As another example of a specific variation within New Right thought, the emerging 
theory of ‘supply-side economics’ also represented a further distinct element of the New 
Right economic model. This variant primarily emphasized the need for lower taxes, free 
trade and deregulation as means of tackling surging inflation, but as a distinctive theory it 
was less fiscally conservative and deflationary in nature than Friedman’s monetarist 
approach, and which again highlights variable inherent elements and traditions con-
tained within the broader New Right political narrative. Such influences nevertheless 
came to gradually fuse together in broader economic policy terms, generating some 
degree of eventual coherence in advocating more explicit de-regulation of the economy, 
the promotion of ‘free market’ popular capitalism, while encouraging a culture of 
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enhanced economic liberalism and personal freedoms (via reduced taxation in particu-
lar); all of which came to be emblematic features of the New Right’s agenda and 
perspective.
The works of Friedman and Hayek in particular consequently contributed to shaping 
Margaret Thatcher’s personal ideological convictions, and in turn provided the intellec-
tual basis for her government to decisively overturn the postwar consensus. Thatcher was 
further bolstered by contemporary domestic political mentors such as Enoch Powell, 
whose prominent critique of the statist postwar settlement was increasingly proclaimed 
during the 1950s and 60s, as well as bodies such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA, 
founded in 1955 under the considerable influence of Hayek), and which sought to 
explicitly and forcefully challenge the basis of the Keynesian postwar settlement. This 
was followed by the emergence the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 1974, co-founded 
by other key mentors such as Sir Keith Joseph and Alfred Sherman, along with Thatcher 
herself. They collectively sought to utilize it as ‘an institutional base for the dissemination 
of (their) revisionist agenda’5 to promote a free market-oriented policy programme.
Such bodies and their advocacy of economic liberalism would challenge the estab-
lished model of the British welfare state and its associated policies with considerable 
vigour, specifically as the financial implications of its cost became increasingly evident 
during an era of growing economic strain. Powell’s ‘revisionist’ economic rhetoric, 
alongside the various publications and literature of both the IEA and CPS during the 
1960s and 70s, subsequently helped to set the scene for the emergence of ‘Thatcherism’ as 
the embodiment of New Right theory in action. Such variable influences of this New 
Right agenda therefore fused together to formulate a revived philosophical strand of both 
British and international (notably American) conservative thought that rejected the 
inherent structure of the postwar consensus, in particular the extent of the state’s 
intervention and regulation of the mixed economy, along with associated high taxation 
and corporatist trade union power. As a diametric alternative to the era of consensus, 
New Right theory confidently claimed that a smaller ‘neoliberal state’6 would maximize 
economic output more efficiently, although such output would not be shared more 
equally across society, arising from the principles of the so-called ‘trickle-down effect’, 
which entailed that by prioritizing the economic opportunities and prosperity of the 
wealthiest and the employer/business classes, such wealth would then spread downwards 
‘to the rest of society . . . . (to) generate employment and finance welfare provision’.7 
However, such a concept of wealth ‘benevolently’ trickling down the social spectrum 
fuelled by the dynamics of the free market has been heavily criticized by the egalitarian 
left in terms of both its efficacy and social justice implications in subsequent years.
Context: the collapse of the postwar consensus
The Thatcher leadership from 1975 (initially in political opposition) sought to practically 
develop and blend such influences into a socio-economic blueprint geared towards 
steering Britain in a distinctly different political direction, offering a stark contrast to 
the bulk of the historical period since 1945. The postwar era was essentially one that had 
been entrenched in the supposed certainties of the Keynesian ‘mixed economy’, albeit 
one skewed to the political left but broadly accepted by many pragmatic and moderate 
‘One Nation’ Conservatives. However, such certainties had become distorted and 
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undermined by major global and domestic economic problems that steadily gained 
momentum throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and Thatcher was willing to further 
challenge them with her own brand of ‘conviction’ and ideology-driven political 
beliefs.8 However, such ideological conviction was not always explicitly present from 
the outset of her leadership and would develop further as her confidence and political 
power grew as the 1980s progressed. She was nevertheless guided by some fundamental 
founding principles that would remain consistent and shape her political legacy, having 
ruefully concluded that the Conservative Party she inherited was ‘barely distinguishable 
from . . . . post-war Labour governments’, with the country having ‘lost its economic 
dynamism, resulting in a negative mood of ‘decline and dependency’9 emerging.
Within a distinctly British political context therefore, the New Right movement 
ultimately evolved as a vigorous political force in a circumstantial manner, with its 
emerging prominence less of an ideological necessity and arguably ‘more a response to 
events’.10 This circumstantial narrative and contextual emphasis has been echoed by 
various sources, with academics such as Letwin claiming that ‘Thatcherite policies did 
not spring out of nothing’, but were rather shaped ‘by a confluence of ideas, activities and 
circumstances’.11 The specific circumstances and ‘events’ that the British New Right 
variant sought to respond to represented the tumultuous climax of the sustained epoch 
of consensus from 1945; which was reaching crisis point as the 1970s progressed, and 
which had effectively collapsed by the end of this decade. A growing mood was therefore 
emerging that postwar British governments had ultimately failed in this consensual 
approach, and that administrations of all political persuasions broadly taxed and spent 
too much, had evidently not addressed Britain’s postwar economic decline and industrial 
inefficiencies, and that the corporatist nature of trade union power was excessive and 
insufficiently controlled. This led some on the political right to label the country as ‘the 
sick man of Europe’12 and such matters came to a shattering crescendo in the winter of 
1978/79, when rampant trade unionism triggered the ‘Winter of Discontent’ and the 
apparent destabilization of functioning government, with even high-profile figures of the 
political left such as Harold Wilson acknowledging the increasing alienation of public 
opinion from the Labour administration of James Callaghan.13
Critics of the Keynesian settlement from the political right ultimately claimed that it 
had served its immediate purpose in promoting a short-term stimulus to encourage 
postwar recovery, but in the long term it had simply generated increased levels of 
taxation, inflation, and public spending as an overall percentage of GDP, which collec-
tively restricted long-term national economic growth. As a consequence, by the advent of 
the 1970s Britain’s postwar economic performance was increasingly sluggish compared 
to other western nations (a phenomenon often referred to as ‘stagflation’).14 Such 
economic strains and pressures were certainly evident in the gradual reduction of the 
scale of public expenditure under the administrations of Wilson and Callaghan (1974–9), 
particularly during the twilight phase of Labour in government following the significant 
cutbacks imposed by the IMF’s dramatic intervention in 1976. This period has been said 
by some observers to mark the end of the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of economic growth15 
and was initially sparked by the 1973 global oil crisis; subsequently featuring rising 
unemployment, surging inflation and increased demands for significant reductions in 
UK public expenditure. This scenario inexorably culminated in the aforementioned and 
iconic ‘Winter of Discontent’, which proved to be the ultimate catalyst for thrusting New 
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Right theories into the frontline of political debate. This chaotic socio-political environ-
ment appeared to vindicate the alternative political and economic agenda being increas-
ingly espoused by the New Right’s most pro-active contemporary political figureheads 
such as Keith Joseph, and as a consequence of such sustained industrial and economic 
disruption, a significant public backlash was evident in the 1979 General Election, where 
Labour was seemingly punished for its association with ‘tax and spend’ policies and trade 
union power, and this appeared to confirm the definitive collapse of the postwar 
consensus.
The ethos and principles of the New Right political model
The specific political priorities of the incoming government after 1979 were therefore 
focused on instigating a long-term restructuring of the British model of government from 
its traditional postwar collectivist appearance, and to instil a more individualist socio- 
political framework and culture. Yet despite having consequently gained some notable 
influence over the Conservative Party’s political direction, it would be a significant 
challenge for New Right ideology to maintain this role and to shape both the structure 
of government and various key policies, particularly as its ideological vanguard formed 
only a minority clique within the wider parliamentary Conservative Party at the time.16 
Nevertheless, the New Right viewpoint came to increasingly influence the party’s sus-
tained spell in political office from 1979, pushing the Thatcher administration of the 
1980s in a more explicitly ideological direction compared to the conventional pragma-
tism that many observers had associated with the Conservative Party’s approach to 
governance for much of the twentieth century. The 1980s therefore witnessed the 
ideological edge of the New Right in operation in British politics, and during this era it 
also became established as a transatlantic political presence, reacting to both interna-
tional and domestic events with its own proposed policy remedies to address the various 
socio-economic problems of the time. Consequently, politicians that were aligned with its 
principles such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher consolidated and entrenched 
their grip on political power in the USA and Britain, respectively, for most of this decade.
As the postwar consensus collapsed into disarray during the 1970s, a socio-economic 
vacuum emerged which the New Right sought to enthusiastically replace with a more 
meritocratic, individualistic, and entrepreneurial model of society. Yet despite its ‘free 
market’ emphasis, it did acknowledge the need for some variant of a welfare state to exist, 
albeit a less vast and bureaucratic one. Under this New Right structural vision, the 
bloated welfare provision which was perceived to be a drain on national economic 
resources would be re-shaped and its funding levels reviewed and adapted to the 
dynamism of a recalibrated neoliberal economy. While this suggested greater organiza-
tional efficiency and less bureaucracy, such a blueprint for welfare would also be less 
comprehensive in its public reach, a potentially negative implication for the more 
vulnerable members of society inclined to use such services more often. As previously 
alluded to, the political left has consistently questioned the effectiveness, fairness and 
‘socially just’ implications of such a free market focus and ‘trickle-down’ approach in the 
practical provision of effective public services, and have vehemently argued that such 
neoliberal principles fundamentally conflict with the more egalitarian and Keynesian 
socio-political model favoured by socialists and social democrats.
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The New Right neoliberal ethos has certainly acknowledged that a more egalitarian 
model of society would never be the practical outcome of its preferred economic 
structure, but this is viewed as both a natural and desirable outcome of such explicit 
economic liberalism, as New Right theory perceives inequality as a natural and desirable 
state of affairs aligned with a specific view of human nature, distinguishing ‘sharply 
between equality of rights and equality of opportunity . . . . and material equality of 
outcome.17 Yet in pursuing the approach to governance that it did, New Right influences 
formulated some crucial and relatively original policy decisions as Britain reached 
a critical socio-economic crossroads regarding the sustainability of its levels of taxation, 
public spending and overall public service and welfare provision. In therefore seeking to 
move the country on from a historical period increasingly viewed as being stagnant and 
regressive in its entrenched left-of-centre socio-economic agenda, the New Right’s 
ideological crusade advocated the formation of an administration and a revised political 
structure that would revolutionize the culture, direction and emphasis of government 
policy-making in the UK, and in the process forcefully drag the gravity of British politics 
towards the right-of-centre from its social-democratic location.
From the vantage point of the New Right’s perspective in national political opposition 
between 1974 and 79, its profile had indeed been boosted by the activities of Joseph, the 
IEA and CPS (and similar ideological trends and bodies in the USA), and it would 
gradually come to wield further influence over the party leadership. The more radical 
tendencies of New Right theory consequently identified the increasingly expensive 
welfare state as an area that needed significant reform and retrenchment in the context 
of the industrial unrest and negative economic growth of the 1970s, and this perspective 
gained considerable further momentum after Thatcher became Conservative Leader in 
1975. The New Right’s emergence on the political scene reflected ‘a major departure from 
the political consensus’ as well as ‘a fundamental change of direction for the 
Conservatives’,18 which as a party had previously supported the welfare state’s inflated 
bureaucratic existence for the majority of the postwar ‘consensus’ era.
However, the adoption of this revised strategic approach aligned with Thatcher’s 
evident ‘dislike of political consensus between the parties’19 that had prevailed for 
much of the post-1945 period.20 Within this context, the New Right agenda and proposed 
political structure can be viewed as ‘a libertarian project bent on destroying the “liberal 
consensus”’21 within the British political system, and as a notably different agenda it 
aspired to re-shape what it perceived as a dormant period of postwar governance by 
pursuing a contrasting governmental ethos that aligned ‘the notion of conviction with the 
metaphor of movement and direction’.22 This was an energetic political image cultivated 
by the prominent analysis of Shirley Letwin in particular, which sought to emphasize the 
notion of the ‘vigorous virtues’23 as being an essential component of Thatcherism, while 
also seeking to clarify the connections between the liberal (Hayekian) aspects of the New 
Right with the more traditional conservative elements that would blend together to form 
the crux of Thatcherism. Such an emphasis appeared to instil the necessary dynamism 
and distinctive appeal into the Conservative Party’s political programme from 1979 
onwards, which contrasted sharply with the tired and stale image of Labour in office, 
while also generating significant media support and advocacy, and in turn steadily 
growing levels of public appeal, as became apparent in the 1979 electoral outcome 
when the Conservatives were victorious on a larger than average swing.24
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As a further response to global socio-economic developments and trends that were 
increasingly evident as the 1970s progressed and the mood of consensus faded away, the 
New Right’s advocates in government came to enthusiastically promote the perceived 
merits of monetarist theory (as espoused by its founding father Friedman), whereby they 
endorsed tighter control of the money supply, opposition to unnecessary government 
‘interference’ (as evident in excessive ‘welfarism’), and the eventual desired outcome of 
reduced levels of public expenditure. This more explicitly ideological approach would 
also later influence the policy of ‘denationalization’ of British state-run industries, an 
approach that became more commonly referred to as privatization as the 1980s pro-
gressed. In espousing a less ‘statist’ outlook and a greater emphasis on ‘marketization’, the 
incoming Thatcher government proposed what has been summarized as a ‘neo-liberal 
ideological assault on the post-war settlement’,25 and this New Right perspective also 
argued that instead of targeting zero unemployment (as the prevailing postwar social- 
democratic model of governance had done), the market would determine a natural rate 
of unemployment, and inflation would instead be prioritized. Within such a context, the 
advocacy of Friedman’s monetarist doctrine was therefore justified on the premise that it 
rejected interventionist and ultimately futile attempts ‘to push unemployment to zero 
(which would) no longer trigger inflationary spirals’.26 Such sentiments appeared to be 
shared with varying degrees of enthusiasm by both moderate Labour politicians as well as 
neoliberal theorists and economists, which seemed to affirm the bleak implications for 
the long-term sustainability of the postwar political consensus and its supporting bureau-
cratic structure by the mid to late 1970s.
As already highlighted, between 1945 and the mid-1970s broad bipartisan agreement 
had existed regarding the levels of public spending and investment in social policies and 
public services, and from a longer-term perspective, this period witnessed the state taking 
on a gradually increased degree of social responsibility for British citizens, with progres-
sively enhanced welfare provision and a more equal society developing ‘as the gap 
between richest and poorest closed’,27 albeit at substantial public cost. Yet as an appar-
ently negative economic consequence of such egalitarian trends, UK government expen-
diture as a percentage of GDP during this specific historical period reached the 
historically high level of 48.9% in 1975,28 although this appeared to be an initial short- 
term legacy of the 1974–75 recession (with a similar inflationary trend notable after the 
2008 economic slump), and this heightened percentage could also be partly explained by 
the fact that the country’s overall GDP had shrunk. Nevertheless, such generally rising 
trends of government expenditure culminated in intervention from the IMF in 1976, 
provoking the Labour government of James Callaghan (1976–79) to publicly acknowl-
edge that Keynesian economics linked to an ever-growing state, its associated bureau-
cratic structure, and range of generous and costly social policies was no longer 
economically viable or sustainable for the foreseeable future,29 even before the practical 
advent of Thatcherism in office.
The Thatcher government, its diagnosis, and impact (1979-90)
Within such a context, after coming to power in 1979 with a sturdy and fairly broad 
coalition of both media and public opinion on its side, the thrust of Conservative policy- 
making consequently prioritized the issues it had an explicit mandate to tackle, aligned 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 7
with a greater economic as opposed to social focus, although there were direct social and 
welfare policy implications. The newly elected Thatcher administration was therefore 
evidently influenced by what at times appeared to be a New Right ideology evolving in 
coherence, albeit one with ongoing varying strands of underlying influence as have been 
highlighted. Indeed, there has been considerable subsequent debate as to what degree it 
had a fully formed ideological purpose on taking office, or whether its inherent values 
evolved over various phases into what became known as ‘Thatcherism’ over the next 
decade.30 For example, while Hayek and Friedman were ostensibly seen as the principal 
intellectual architects of much of the emerging radical policy agenda, they were not 
wholly united in their proposed political and economic remedies, and Hayek himself did 
not actually support the implementation of monetarist policy and the way it was 
employed. Both he and similar-minded scholars concluded it did not work as envisaged 
(even before it was quietly discarded as the 1980s progressed), on the fundamental 
premise that they viewed it as a mere technical fix that distracted from the more 
fundamental task of re-creating the conditions for a pure free market structural order, 
as espoused in the 1970s by the likes of Robert Nozick and his concept of the ‘minimal 
state’31 (yet which was perhaps not practically possible in a country with such an 
entrenched social-democratic legacy). This would support the argument that the New 
Right was actually a spectrum of ideas with some unifying common themes, but which 
often disagreed on objectives and policy instruments.
Nevertheless, general monetarist influences were initially evident in the Thatcher 
government’s focus on addressing deep-rooted structural problems within the British 
economy that were a side-effect of the generous postwar model of welfare provision. 
A particular initial policy focus was to address the unerring scourge of inflation (as 
previously alluded to), and the new Prime Minister was said to have had a ‘moral hatred 
of inflation’32 and its impact on everyday prices, which perhaps reflected her frugal 
background as the ‘Grocer’s daughter’.33 After inflation had spiralled upwards and 
peaked at 26% during the mid-1970s, the Thatcherite analysis argued that this was 
primarily due to decades of inefficient postwar public expenditure and state intervention, 
with the government subsidizing failing nationalized industries and surplus jobs in the 
name of maintaining social harmony, often in defiance of the demands of the ‘iron laws’ 
of the free market. Such an interpretation appeared to have been digested by various 
senior figures within the Thatcher administration from an early stage of its existence, as 
a significant number were seen to have been ‘emboldened intellectually’ by New Right 
theory and influences, whose analysis had identified various economic problems of the 
1970s being ostensibly caused by ‘successive post-war governments . . . . not allowing “the 
market” to function freely’.34
This focus on tackling inflation could therefore be viewed as the principal economic 
priority from the outset for the Thatcher government, which notably diverged from 
focusing on the maintenance of high employment levels as had been prioritized for much 
of the postwar era of consensus. Yet such a focus would be severely tested in the fall-out 
from the sharply rising number of job losses during the early 1980s, resulting in mass 
unemployment amidst an initial mood of political and economic crisis, although in 
politically beneficial terms it would in the longer-term result in the restructuring of the 
British economy and the eventual weakening of trade union power. As another policy 
example, the New Right emphasis on fiscally conservative economics was also clearly 
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evident in early bold cuts in income tax in the 1979 budget,35 which implied less 
government expenditure. In addition, one of Thatcher’s initial forays into social policy 
saw her government abolish the link between pensions and earnings in 1980, a move that 
appeared to be primarily motivated by economic motives and specifically securing 
further reductions in public spending.
The Thatcher administration therefore advocated a return to liberal economics of the 
‘Victorian era’, stemming from her ‘Methodist’ upbringing and associated sympathies 
with Victorian social and economic values of thrift and self-help, and in doing so 
represented an ideological backlash against the prevailing socio-economic conditions 
that had driven the dominant social democratic model of government for postwar 
Britain. This new approach could be seen as justified given what has been described as 
the UK’s apparently ‘perilous state . . . . prior to Thatcher’s electoral victory in 1979ʹ,36 
and this proposed solution has been succinctly described as representing the reformula-
tion of ‘free economy and a strong state’, notably within Andrew Gamble’s prominent 
analysis of the New Right’s policy approach and its legacy,37 and particular its distinctive 
fusion of economic liberalism and social conservatism. In similar vein, according to 
Letwin and her similarly noteworthy analysis of the core features of the Thatcher 
government, this did not mean that Thatcherism was only about economics, but was 
rather ‘more precisely, a way of not doing economic policy’.38 Such a distinctive change 
of government direction offered a contrasting political outlook from what had gone 
before and triggered a clear shift towards fiscal retrenchment, the marketization and 
streamlining of public services, and an intense focus on reduced government spending 
commitments.
Academic scholars such as Gamble have emphasized that a variation of a ‘strong state’ 
was required to instil the necessary structural framework to allow the Thatcher govern-
ment to impose both its moral values and political direction, while simultaneously 
allowing capitalism to flourish by seeking to actively ‘unwind the coils of social democ-
racy and welfarism that had fastened around the free economy’.39 Indeed, this inter-
pretation of the New Right’s key aims indicates that an appropriate governmental 
architecture was seen as an essential factor for capitalism to function at its most beneficial 
and efficient, and for a ‘strong state’ to break the resistance of more conventional/ 
conservative social forces that were resistant to free market dynamics; as espoused by 
the concept of ‘ordoliberalism’40 that envisages at least a role for the state as an instigator 
to ensure the appropriate conditions for a liberal (free market) economic order. This 
would serve to ideally produce an economic system that according to Gamble was 
‘dynamic and productive’ yet still reliant ‘upon institutions that the market itself cannot 
generate spontaneously’.41 Such an emphasis arose from the Thatcherite perspective that 
the postwar model of social democratic government was skewed towards statist solutions 
that were fundamentally flawed, arising from the premise that ‘Keynesianism was 
anathema’,42 and the most radical Thatcherite analysis advocated that the basic founda-
tions of the British welfare model required dismantling and re-structuring in a wholly 
new guise.
Michael Moran has described this reformist and revamped recipe of New Right 
broader public service provision as representing ‘the new regulatory state’ or 
‘reregulation’,43 as opposed to the more conventional term of deregulation, arguing 
that during the Thatcher era the power of independent professions and ‘club’ 
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government was destroyed and replaced by internal markets, purchaser/provider splits, 
compulsory competitive tendering and other hallmarks of a redefined regulatory state. In 
short, it could be argued that one set of normative regulations were replaced by another 
set, albeit of a type more suited to the Thatcher style of government and its free market 
ethos. It was in such a context that the 1980s witnessed ‘concerted attempts. . . . . to 
refashion the welfare state’,44 although without always reducing spending, and it was 
within this innovative context that from 1979 onwards the Thatcher government and its 
New Right influences evidently sought to radically revise the distinctly Keynesian legacy 
it had inherited.
By the start of the 1980s, the immediate short-term social consequences of such an 
austere approach to reducing the cost and scope of public expenditure and associated 
welfare provision were fairly harsh in terms of the specific social unrest that the Thatcher 
administration faced. Therefore, when such primary economic imperatives of cuts in 
both direct taxation and public spending led to a practical ‘rolling back’ of the state and 
subsequent reductions of industrial subsidies as well as welfare and social policies, there 
were serious and destabilizing social repercussions. Subsequently, in the aftermath of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe’s controversial 1981 ’retrenchment’ Budget, 
featuring significant cuts in both borrowing and spending that have been described as 
‘severe’,45 and the extent of such discord that followed saw various inner-cities such as 
Liverpool, Manchester and London erupting in violent protest. As notable areas of multi- 
ethnicity, deprivation and high unemployment, this created a backdrop of extreme and 
destructive rioting and divisive social unrest among poorer social groups disproportio-
nately impacted by such sharp reductions in government expenditure. Accordingly, more 
moderate ‘One Nation’ Conservative Party figures such as Gilmour, Heseltine, Prior and 
Pym were alarmed at such brutal social implications of Thatcherism, claiming that on 
two fronts, ‘economically and socially, the government was steering for the rocks’.46 Such 
fears of widening social unrest contrasted sharply with the views of the more avowedly 
Thatcherite ministers within government, most prominently Norman Tebbit, who in the 
midst of such escalating unemployment and social disharmony somewhat infamously 
referred to growing up ‘in the ‘30s with an unemployed father’, while adding that ‘he 
didn’t riot. He got on his bike and looked for work, and he kept looking ‘til he found it’.47 
This less sympathetic Thatcherite reaction to such social unrest therefore contrasted 
sharply with the ‘One Nation’ Conservative viewpoint, and such differences reflected 
a notable fracture within the Conservative Party of this period, and indeed beyond it.
This more explicit economy-focused approach of the 1980s therefore created condi-
tions for further episodes of broader social disharmony throughout the decade; evident 
not only in the inner-city riots of 1981, but also in the Miners’ Strike of 1984–5 and the 
poll tax protests of 1989–90. In the wake of such recurring socio-economic unrest, debate 
ensued both then and since as to whether the Conservative government after 1979 
merited more failure than success (on various levels), and political commentators and 
academics ranging from David Willetts to Shirley Letwin have specifically identified the 
first term of Thatcher’s Conservative administration as further evident proof that the 
government was explicitly and determinedly pursuing a New Right themed policy 
programme that was ‘above all, economic’48 in its core emphasis. As a consequence, 
expansive social policy and broader welfare reform became relatively neglected and even 
expendable in some cases, being subservient to the fundamental aim of balancing the 
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books and achieving greater long-term economic stability, dynamism, and efficiency. As 
Letwin argued in her allusion to the ‘vigorous virtues’ of Thatcherism in practice, such an 
emphasis on dynamic economic liberalism grew in its boldness the longer Thatcher was 
in power, and it was particularly during her second term (1983–87) that her policy 
agenda asserted an even more explicit economic emphasis, with flagship populist policies 
such as privatization and further cuts in direct taxation (most notably in the 1988 budget) 
flourishing in ideological vigour. The consequent perceived prioritization of the indivi-
dual over social matters is often epitomized by the infamous comments that Thatcher 
made in a ‘Woman’s Own’ magazine interview following her third electoral victory in 
1987 that ‘There is no such thing as society . . . . There are individual men and women and 
there are families’,49 a phrase often used out of its full context but which nevertheless 
appeared to reflect her emphasis on economic and atomistic individualism rather than 
a communitarian, social outlook.
There have subsequently been critical and negative interpretations of the Conservative 
Party’s political record and impact in office during the 1980s, and this has re-enforced an 
often negative perception that Conservatives of the New Right variant were ‘not interested 
in society, and were merely concerned with economics’,50 culminating in the socio- 
economic criticisms that relative ‘under-funding on public services’ was a key legacy of 
‘Conservative social policy in the 1980s and 1990s’.51 As previously highlighted, there were 
indeed often negative and unequal social consequences to the economic policies pursued by 
the Thatcher government that adversely affected poorer members of society, and there were 
also tensions within the broader New Right family between the economic neoliberals who 
wanted more radically de-regulated public services, and those of a more authoritarian and 
socially conservative nature who favoured maintaining the revised, regulatory, and pre-
scriptive features of the ‘strong state’ as alluded to by Andrew Gamble. A range of distinct 
flagship social policies nevertheless emerged from such ideological tensions, an example 
being the acceleration of council house sales and the associated reduction in state respon-
sibility (that as a deregulatory policy proved to be electorally popular), while the 1988 
Education Reform Act was more neoconservative in its focus, yet which again featured 
elements of marketization introduced into a core public service. Overall, key welfare and 
social policies during this historical era were ultimately affected by the government’s desire 
to shrink the size and scope of both its economic and interventionist footprint (reflecting 
evident New Right influence), which would set a precedent for future Conservative 
administrations in their approach to these specific policy spheres.
Conservative governance amidst the aftermath of Thatcherism
In contrast to its perceived neglect and indifference to social policy, during the 1980s 
the Conservative Party established a sufficient reputation of economic competence as 
a critical component of the radical New Right agenda and project. Economic cred-
ibility and associated growth therefore appeared to be the cornerstone of its political 
hegemony, and this reputation was a key factor in the party’s impressive achievement 
of four successive general election victories between 1979 and 1992, with economic 
credibility perhaps the crucial factor in its success in the particularly closely-fought 
general election of 1992.52 This positive image had been steadily cultivated by the 
New Right’s economically liberal policy agenda that had featured direct taxation cuts, 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 11
privatization and explicit anti-inflationary measures pursued throughout the 1980s. 
However, this reputation was largely decimated following the debacle of ‘Black 
Wednesday’ on 16 September 1992, and in the aftermath of this traumatic episode 
John Major’s administration faced the harsh reality that the Conservatives’ former 
superiority on economic policy matters was eradicated by a sudden collapse of public 
trust on this vital issue. New Labour subsequently eclipsed the Conservatives in 
terms of perceived economic competence, and the outcome of the 1997 general 
election was arguably sealed some years beforehand on the basis of such fundamental 
economic factors affecting electoral fortunes.53
Given the electoral devastation of 1997 and further heavy defeats that followed in 2001 
and 2005, it was evident that not only had the Conservative Party lost its previously 
dominant image of economic probity, but of further significance, was also perceived as 
being out of touch with significant swathes of contemporary British society, particularly 
regarding various aspects of modern lifestyle attitudes and the associated social policies 
that had become determinants in many people’s patterns of voting behaviour. This 
perhaps indicated that just as Keynesianism had appeared to have served its purpose as 
a socio-economic model for governance by the mid-1970s, so arguably had the principles 
and policies associated with the New Right by the mid-1990s, although various 
Conservative politicians were often resistant to this inference, given that Thatcherism’s 
roots in the party had gradually grown from its initial minority clique. This went to the 
heart of the Conservative Party’s troubled and uncertain identity in the post-Thatcher 
period from 1990 onwards, with rival influences grappling for the party’s ideological soul, 
reflecting the divisions that the New Right’s socio-economic legacy had impacted on the 
internal equilibrium of British Conservatism. In some respects, it can therefore be argued 
that while society appeared to have evolved and developed during the party’s eighteen 
years in power (1979–97), the Conservative hierarchy and its broad attitudes to society 
had somewhat stagnated and seemingly failed to adapt. This was despite there being 
evidence of some notable demographic shifts in terms of gender politics, greater sexual 
diversity, more non-conventional family models and higher levels of multi-ethnicity 
within an overall more diverse and tolerant British social structure.54
Following the previously highlighted episodes of social turmoil in the 1980s, some 
post-Thatcher Conservatives have been sensitive to comparisons between their socio- 
economic policy agenda with that of the 1980s variant, specifically regarding perceptions 
of neglect of poorer, urban areas and their inhabitants who on the whole are reliant on 
greater levels of state provision and welfare support. However, it remains open to 
conjecture to what degree the reversion to retrenchment and austerity after 2010 was 
specifically influenced by the legacy of the New Right-policy agenda or whether this 
reflected a totally different set of socio-economic circumstances, and was instead 
a reversion to an older model of fiscal conservatism. Fears of scenes of social unrest in 
the context of economic cutbacks (commencing from 2010 to deal with the inflated 
national deficit) became reality with protests over student tuition fees increases in late 
2010, followed by extreme social unrest and rioting in summer 2011 (ostensibly linked to 
the government’s austerity agenda). On the basis of such disruptive social events, there is 
perhaps some potential for a coherent link to be made between the socio-economic 
approach of the New Right and the model of ‘austerity’ governance particularly adopted 
by Cameron’s coalition administration between 2010 and 15.
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While pessimistic parallels with the 1981 Thatcher/Howe Budget were highlighted by 
many on the political left amidst the inception of the post-2010 austerity agenda, the New 
Right interpretation offers the alternative more optimistic historical perspective that on 
a primarily economic and fiscal level, the 1981 government budget is ‘considered the 
epitome of soundness, an exercise in rigour that laid the foundations for the strong 
economic recovery’.55 This budget has therefore been widely viewed as one of the most 
significant socio-economic historical precedents for later generations to absorb from the 
New Right’s most obvious period of political ascendancy.56 Despite it provoking some 
notable internal and external political opposition at the time, it can nevertheless be seen 
as a benchmark to be adhered to by the ‘fiscal’ Conservatives of the contemporary era, 
offering a blueprint for future Conservative administrations in dealing with challenging 
economic conditions. It has however been noted by various political commentators that 
David Cameron (from 2005) was the first Conservative Party Leader since 1997 who 
sought to more explicitly address the social implications of the neoliberal economic 
model in a way that the more ardent Thatcherites had not, with his focus on much 
vaunted concepts such as ‘The Big Society’57 and his broader emphasis on social issues 
whereby he accepted ‘that the party had ignored the adverse social consequences’58 of its 
New Right agenda.
The definitive electoral development of 1997 provided Conservative modernizers with 
a significant impetus to reform and explicitly re-align the party’s ‘post-Thatcher’ position 
in relation to some specific key issues and areas of social policy in particular,59 yet 
without necessarily abandoning the momentous impact of the New Right legacy entirely. 
Therefore, although the Thatcherite emphasis on neoliberal economics, broad deregula-
tion and variable Euroscepticism was largely maintained as key undercurrents of modern 
Conservative identity, social policy focus had emerged as a revived feature in determining 
the broader policy agenda and associated electoral priorities and behaviour. By default 
therefore, social and welfare policy matters arguably required enhanced political atten-
tion after being somewhat sidelined by the economic flavour of the 1980s, and exacer-
bated by associated hostility from parts of the political right to the perceived dependency 
culture engendered by postwar social and welfare policies. The New Right’s economic 
emphasis of the 1980s had ultimately moved the broader political debate and wider 
public mood in its favour in the shorter term, but the longer-term and more diverse social 
trends and developments that arose from this period were less aligned with such 
neoconservative social values and therefore eroded the Conservative Party’s long-term 
electoral prospects. David Cameron’s leadership of the Conservative Party sought to 
embrace the evolution of contemporary British society as an integral aspect of his strategy 
to reverse the tide of repeated electoral defeat. Indeed, he personally acknowledged that 
‘towards the end of the 1980s we did become too much the economics party’, having ‘won 
the battle of ideas in political economy’, with New Labour’s moderate emergence the 
‘very proof of that’.60
Cameron’s viewpoint acknowledging the need to offer a refreshed emphasis to 
social policy echoed those of illustrious political heavyweights who had preceded him 
in holding prominent party positions following the loss of national power in 1997. As 
an example, by the late 1990s Michael Portillo, the former Thatcher Cabinet Minister 
and later Shadow Chancellor (2000–2001) claimed (as part of his transformation 
from a New Right disciple of Thatcherism to a socially liberal conservative), that the 
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Conservative Party needed to address the negative perceptions of its approach to 
welfare, social policy and broader social attitudes. Even William Hague (party leader 
1997–2001), and viewed as being less socially liberal than both Cameron and the 
post-1997 Portillo, accepted that the ‘Tories cannot any longer be just an “economic 
party”. . . . . (and must) open up on . . . . welfare and other social issues’.61 Therefore, 
despite such ostensible success in re-shaping the country’s long-term economic 
infrastructure amidst the landmark decade of the 1980s, it appeared that by the 
early twenty-first century there required a more explicit focus on social issues that 
had been somewhat neglected during the period of New Right hegemony, and that 
according to Willetts the Conservative Party had been responsible for ‘shirking 
responsibility for . . . . social issues where it ought to act’.62 Such apparent neglect 
and distraction from the social angle of policy-making ultimately appeared to result 
in the Conservatives becoming dislocated from the mainstream electorate’s general 
social values and expectations that had arisen from the dramatic socio-economic 
changes of the 1980s, and which provides one broader explanation for the declining 
levels of electoral support experienced by the party from the mid-1990s onwards.
The New Right’s impact on twenty-first century conservatism
Subsequently, while during the 1980s the focused emphasis on radical economic 
restructuring can be viewed as a direct consequence of New Right influence, social 
policy remained a comparatively low priority, and there were somewhat accurate 
predictions during the Major era (1990–97) that the ‘new theme of more fundamental 
change in Britain’s welfare state. . . . . will fall to the younger generation of 
Conservatives to elaborate’.63 This line of analysis certainly struck a chord with 
newly-elected Conservative ‘modernizers’, who having surveyed the wreckage of the 
1997 general election defeat, subsequently sought to steer the Party back on the road 
to electability and broader public appeal in the ensuing years of the early twenty-first 
century. This focus on the need for a refreshed and more attractive electoral message 
resulted in a revision of the New Right’s legacy in terms of shaping a new direction 
for the Conservative Party, which resonated with post-2010 Prime Ministers such as 
David Cameron and Theresa May in particular. Under the leadership of Cameron 
between 2005 and 2016, Conservative modernizers energetically sought to address the 
adverse social implications caused by neoliberal economics and the smaller state that 
Thatcherism had principally created, yet their efforts seemed to sit incongruously 
next to the social unrest that engulfed parts of urban Britain by the middle of 2011. 
While he consistently expressed a ‘One Nation’ style paternalistic concern for poorer 
members of society, Cameron nevertheless expressed little sympathy for those 
involved in such unrest and publicly acknowledged the need for significant economic 
cutbacks that were broadly aligned with the New Right’s general fiscal principles and 
economic model. There ultimately appeared to be a sense of paradox within the 
Cameron socio-economic prescription between 2010 and 16, namely in relation to 
how the circle could be squared between a more ‘compassionate’ social focus, along-
side reduced government expenditure, streamlined public services, and the personal 
hardships and notable social tensions that subsequently entailed for some poorer 
citizens.
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This post-Thatcher legacy ultimately generated a scenario whereby the 
Conservatives appeared to have become progressively detached from the divergent 
lifestyle trends and broader social mood of wider society during the final years of the 
twentieth century, the tail-end of a 100-year period that the party had politically 
dominated. This tendency was observed by the polling of major Conservative donor 
Michael Ashcroft after the party’s third successive General Election defeat in 2005, 
when he warned that despite a modest electoral improvement (an increased vote of 
0.7%), popular support for the party was effectively ‘flatlining’ and had risen mini-
mally in eight years (1.7%).64 Ashcroft’s polling subsequently and starkly confirmed 
that there needed to be urgent ‘modernization’ and radical reform of the Conservative 
Party’s values and identity if the party was to electorally recover.65 As already noted, 
a concerted attempt to reset the party’s political balance between its economic and 
social priorities had become particularly evident during the Cameron leadership, with 
its ‘modernizing’ focus on supporting core services such as the NHS instead of cutting 
taxes, while also being ostensibly ‘at ease with modern Britain (as) . . . . a multicultural 
society . . . . with people who had different lifestyles and sexual preferences’.66 This 
introspective analysis and subsequent desire for a fresh strategic approach was a re- 
aligned response to external opinions about the Conservative Party image, identity 
and wider public perception in the aftermath of the dominant New Right era, and 
specifically the Thatcherite attachment to ostensibly ‘old-fashioned’ conservative 
Victorian social attitudes, which could be perceived as being aligned with moralistic 
intolerance.
Such self-reflection became most pronounced at the 2002 Conservative Party 
Conference, when Party Chairman Theresa May accepted that the party needed to 
extend its popular appeal and effectively ‘catch up’ with the views of British society 
that had evolved considerably while the party had been in office between 1979 and 
1997. In this context, May controversially acknowledged that many individuals and 
specific socio-economic groups had negative perceptions of the Conservatives and 
their various social attitudes, remarking that ‘our base is too narrow and so, occa-
sionally, are our sympathies. You know what some people call us – the nasty party’.67 
This brutal self-assessment of being the ‘nasty party’ re-emphasized the fact that in 
the three consecutive general election defeats between 1997 and 2005, the lingering 
influence of the individualistic New Right narrative had potentially contributed to the 
Conservatives’ disconnection from contemporary attitudes of modern, multicultural, 
heterogeneous Britain, and specifically its inherent diversity, communitarianism and 
socially interventionist instincts. Furthermore, while the Conservatives had been 
often abruptly and instinctively opposed to the Labour government’s ‘social 
liberalism’68 and its associated bureaucratic, interventionist and statist enabling 
measures, they had little in terms of a constructive alternative agenda to offer. 
Thus, the New Right vocabulary and rhetoric that was politically positive during 
the 1980s now appeared to hinder efforts to articulate a coherent and persuasive 
Conservative Party programme or image for government in the early twenty-first 
century.
For example, in echoing the Thatcherite ‘Victorian’ and moralistic mentality towards 
social matters, after 1997 the party’s mainstream opinion opposed policies such as 
adoption rights for same-sex couples and repeal of ‘Section 28ʹ regarding the teaching 
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of homosexual lifestyles, while in the economic sphere it initially opposed the minimum 
wage and also the ‘targeted’ tax credits aimed at poorer social groups; all of which in turn 
often created adverse headlines about Conservatism’s apparent indifference to an 
increasingly benevolent and benign public mood. Conservative Party modernizers there-
fore attempted to distance themselves from the intolerant and moralistic aspect of the 
New Right’s neoconservative legacy, being aware of the party’s ‘weak standing with the 
electorate, particularly on health and welfare issues’,69 and subsequently sought to 
progressively and pragmatically cultivate a more appealing image for moderate and 
mainstream floating voters. By the start of the twenty-first century this ultimately led 
to the attempted re-alignment and ‘detoxifying’ of the Conservative image70 in relation to 
various negative features of the New Right’s agenda, and an opportunity to address and 
transcend its ‘divided ideological legacy . . . .(of) economic liberalism (and) social 
conservatism’.71 David Cameron in particular sought to eradicate negative perceptions 
by revising the party’s position on some key social and welfare policy issues and therefore 
made concerted efforts to detach contemporary Conservatism from its ‘image as the 
“nasty” or “uncaring” party. . . . . (and) to “decontaminate” the brand’.72 A very promi-
nent and even provocative example of this revised approach was the Cameron-led 
government’s watershed reform of legalizing same-sex marriage in 2013.
In pursuit of the visible ‘de-toxification’ and ‘decontamination’ of its own formerly 
attractive political brand, the Conservative Party of the early twenty-first century has 
therefore often sought to espouse a more ‘compassionate’ social tone as opposed to 
a primarily economic one. In opposition during the first decade of the century, it 
pragmatically endorsed much of Labour’s additional investment in the welfare state 
and associated increased taxation, which reflected ‘New Labour’s politics of dominance 
in the area of public services’73 and its associated electoral success between 1997 and 
2005. This indicated that the contemporary electorate broadly supported New Labour’s 
attention to reviving public services, although the Conservatives consistently demanded 
greater efficiency and better value for money in the usage of such public finances, which 
was their key qualification for supporting the associated social and welfare policies that 
were funded. In responding to such political realities in a more pragmatic and flexible 
manner, the Conservatives therefore adapted their image and refreshed their policy 
agenda within this specific sphere. This resulted in a departure from the more ideologi-
cally robust and economy-centric agenda of the 1980s, although not always completely 
departing from the New Right legacy completely.
On this premise, the more socially liberal ‘modernizing’ tendency within the 
Conservative Party has notably progressed in influence during the first two decades of 
the twenty-first century, namely at the expense of the economic neoliberals, 
a development which stems from the difficult period incorporating both William 
Hague’s leadership (1997–2001), and also the Iain Duncan Smith era (2001–3) in 
particular.74 During this specific phase of national opposition (1997–2003), the party 
seemed somewhat confused about its political identity and reverted its primary focus on 
shoring up the support of its core supporters and media allies. As a consequence, its 
popular vote remaining static accordingly, while appearing to increasingly ‘shape policy 
in response to the latest headlines in the Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail’.75 Yet despite 
various post-1997 Conservative leaders being publicly intent on gradually broadening the 
appeal and revising the policy agenda of modern, post-Thatcher Conservatism, after 13 
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years in opposition the party’s level of popular support in 2010 was relatively disappoint-
ing, rising less than 6% between the electoral nadir of 1997 and the rather unconvincing 
return to government in 2010. David Cameron subsequently moved into Number 10 
‘with a smaller proportion of support from the electorate than any previous Conservative 
prime minister’,76 which reflected the Conservative Party’s ongoing image problems 
within some sections of society, and which was a cause of concern for the twentieth 
century’s ‘natural party of government’. The successive General Elections of 2015, 2017, 
and 2019 have nevertheless witnessed further evidence of a continuous rising curve of 
Conservative electoral support (dating back to 2001), and beyond 40% in the latter two 
cases,77 but arguably distorted and artificially inflated by the impact of the polarizing 
Brexit debate, as opposed to genuinely popular domestic policy innovation.
Yet in the aftermath of the 2007–8 financial crisis, the Cameron leadership’s decision 
to embrace the language of retrenchment and to somewhat casually abandon its initial 
support for Labour’s expansive spending plans suggested an opportunistic reverse shift 
towards the Thatcherite neoliberal agenda of the 1980s. In pragmatically adapting to the 
crisis economic conditions, Conservative politicians were subsequently emboldened to 
argue for ‘small government’, which instilled some marked divisions and differences (or 
‘clear blue water’)78 between the two main parties regarding both economic and social 
policy. This approach was seen by some critics as a welcomed opportunity for the 
Conservatives to re-assert their case for a revised variant of the New Right’s agenda of 
a reduced state and streamlined expenditure on key welfare and social policies, with 
a prolonged recession and global financial crisis creating the appropriate circumstances 
to be politically exploited to the Conservatives’ own advantage.79 This strategy appeared 
to come to fruition when having returned to government in coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats in 2010, significant public spending cuts were subsequently made in the 
ensuing Emergency Budget. This reflected in economic terms at least, that the party 
had retained some instinctive Thatcherite principles, particularly regarding a ‘scepticism 
towards public spending’.80 Therefore, in this revised analysis of his economic policy- 
making approach, Cameron briskly departed from his previous commitments to adhere 
to Labour’s spending levels, and in doing so ‘rediscovered virtues in Margaret 
Thatcher . . . . hitherto largely airbrushed from history in his speeches . . . . opening up 
the biggest divide on economic policy between the parties for more than a decade’.81
From one perspective, this development could certainly be seen opportunistic, while 
nevertheless creating the potential for the Conservative leadership to critically address 
the spendthrift tendencies of the partially revitalized and centralizing ‘social democratic’ 
state after more than a decade of Labour administration. Yet in arguing for reduced debt 
and deficit levels in the aftermath of such a slump, it gave the possible impression that the 
previous ‘social’ emphasis was superficial and lacked substance. On this premise, the New 
Right’s legacy of fiscal conservatism seemed to have re-emerged on the political horizon 
amidst questionable motives, instilling a further challenging dynamic to the primary aims 
of party modernizers, who had been actively seeking to redefine the party’s approach to 
the management of the British welfare model in a more compassionate manner. 
Cameron’s modernizing tendency were sensitive to the potential hazards in preserving 
such a ‘compassionate’ image for his party while simultaneously focusing on austerity 
and retrenchment, yet a favourable interpretation of such economic difficulties had been 
identified by elements of the New Right during the 1970s, as amidst similar economic 
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turmoil Conservative policies became politically stronger and ‘leadership shifted to those 
most critical of the post-war consensus on social and economic policy . . . . . (who) viewed 
retrenchment not as a necessary evil but as a necessary good’.82 The similar suggestion of 
political opportunism amidst economic uncertainty from 2007/8 was observed in both 
political and academic circles, and Andrew Gamble has noted that dissident figures on 
both the left and right of politics in the 1970s who were disillusioned by the postwar 
consensus and its failings, subsequently ‘welcomed the political space created by the 
recession . . . . for refashioning institutions and redesigning policies in radical ways’.83 
Gamble has referred to such a scenario as representing a ‘crisis of social democracy’84 
which in particular gave the New Right’s thrusting agenda its opportunity to fill a socio- 
political vacuum created by the left, with a distinctively alternative model of government 
more aligned with the principles of free market liberal democracy instead, the so-called 
‘free economy and a strong state’.
Discussion and conclusion
The newer and contemporary generation of Conservative political leaders have strived to 
convince an often-sceptical public audience of their benevolent concern for specific social 
and welfare policy provision as part of the party’s ‘modernization’ process of the early 
twenty-first century. This could well prove to be a significant and ongoing challenge 
given the sentiments from within more recent intakes of Conservative MPs of an appetite 
‘for the Thatcherite agenda of tax cuts, continued marketisation and downward pressure 
on public spending’.85 In this context it would therefore appear that some elements 
within the Conservative Party’s ranks have indeed sensed an opportunity or identified 
a ‘necessary good’ (as was ostensibly so in the 1970s) for further socio-economic 
restructuring and the resurgence of a Thatcherite ‘rolling back’ of the state as 
a consequence of economic difficulties faced since approximately 2008 onwards. 
Broader public opinion towards this approach is often variable, as there has appeared 
some significant volatility in voters’ attitudes towards taxation and funding core public 
services, with analysis from the past decade or so indicating some initial basis of support 
for fiscal retrenchment. This was particularly so in the immediate aftermath of the New 
Labour administrations of Blair and Brown encompassing the first decade of this century, 
whose governance broadly coincided with steadily eroding public attitudes regarding 
‘tax-funded increases in state provision’ alongside a ‘hardening’86 approach towards 
welfare claimants up to and beyond 2010.
Yet following a decade of austerity since 2010, there have been some indications of 
revived public support for tax increases to fund core public services within the welfare 
state’s structure.87 There do, however, remain lingering wider suspicions of Conservative 
public spending proposals on social and welfare policies, arguably linked to New Right 
influences of the past; namely its neoliberal economics and its neoconservative social 
outlook. This has been brought to the fore by the dramatic economic slump and 
associated employment insecurities of those who have unexpectedly come to rely on 
various state welfare provisions in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020. Such 
a scenario presents a further significant challenge to the Conservative Party brand under 
Boris Johnson’s leadership, amidst his somewhat turbulent and unprecedented experi-
ences in power since securing a convincing electoral success in 2019. While adopting an 
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essentially statist response to the pandemic described by one observer as ‘the greatest 
expansion of the state in peacetime history’,88 particularly in the form of Chancellor Rishi 
Sunak’s distinctly generous and interventionist furlough scheme as a short-term fix, the 
longer-term approach and motives in tackling the socio-economic fall-out remains less 
clear.
Such simmering public anxieties regarding Conservative social policy intentions have 
ultimately arisen in the context of how various New Right ideas and theories emerged to 
radically re-structure various components of the established postwar welfare state in 
Britain from 1979 onwards, which appeared to represent a destabilizing feature of core 
public service provision and welfare expenditure during the twentieth century’s final two 
decades in particular. Yet, the somewhat utopian ideological aspirations of a truly liberal-
ized welfare model remained an uncompleted goal during the New Right’s political 
ascendancy of the 1980s, primarily because ‘the structural impediments involved 
(were) . . . . immense’89 and also that ‘a crucial constraint . . . . was the sheer popularity 
of welfare institutions’.90 Consequently, public opinion, specific events and circum-
stances, alongside significant bureaucratic impediments, appeared to be the critical 
factors that ultimately prevented the New Right’s imprint on British society and policy- 
making from being even deeper during its period of paramount political hegemony. 
Nonetheless, its legacy has been of major significance for British politics and society in 
subsequent years, as this article has sought to illustrate. On a broader post-1979 chron-
ological basis therefore, this has been specifically evident in the comparatively less ‘statist’ 
political approach of successive governments from across the political spectrum, incor-
porating the three main UK-wide parties.
Yet the so-called New Right ‘settlement’, consolidated for over 40 years, has reached 
a historical crossroads in the aftermath of further unexpected circumstances, namely the 
pandemic of 2020 and the sustained and expensive state intervention in response to it. 
While it is a matter of political conjecture as to whether the New Right’s legacy can 
practically survive such a tumultuous and unprecedented socio-economic episode, an 
evident and observable trend to have arisen from the Johnson administration’s manage-
ment of the pandemic’s impact has been its high-spending and profligate fiscal tenden-
cies (at least in the short-term). This would suggest that an ideological fluidity and sense 
of pragmatic interventionism has prevailed amidst extreme economic crisis, which 
appears to have heralded the further relative demise of New Right influence after its 
sustained period of hegemonic ascendancy.
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